Asymmetric Conflicts from 1989 - 2001 in quantitative analysis Abstract Following paper discuses two significant concepts in the area of asymmetric warfare. Both are dealing with the phenomenon of weak actors winning in armed conflicts. Ivan Arreguín-Toft is discussing the role of strategic asymmetry and concludes that the strategy actors choose is directly influencing the result of the conflict. Andrew Mack is dealing with the interest asymmetry, saying that strong actors tend to lose because their interest to win is usually weaker than that of their small opponents. In the same time strong actors are politically more vulnerable based on the level of democracy. Both theories are tested by quantitative analysis of all asymmetric conflicts that took place between 1989 and 2000. Values related to strategies, results, strength of the actors, interest and level of democracy are assigned to all conflicts based on information provided in conflict and other databases.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:350232 |
| Date | January 2016 |
| Creators | Kasperová Bubrlová, Markéta |
| Contributors | Karásek, Tomáš, Plechanovová, Běla |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
Page generated in 0.0618 seconds