Some form of absolutism has generally been the majority view within philosophy and in other traditions, and it is common to take absolutism for granted without providing rational arguments or empirical evidence in support of it. However, such attitudes are not viable if we want to avoid dogmatism. In this paper, I question absolutism and the closely associated correspondence theory of truth through the writings of Goodman and Nāgārjuna. I first describe Goodman‟s philosophy with a focus on his works dealing with „worldmaking‟ and multiple true versions. Subsequently follows an outline of Nāgārjuna‟s philosophy, in which he intended to show that the notion of an essence, an inherently existent entity or relation, is incoherent and that essences would be incompatible with experience. I then reflect on the relation between absolutism and relativism, and propose that the philosophies of Goodman and Nāgārjuna make it possible to transcend both. The paper ends with a discussion on the notion of knowledge in the absence of absolute entities and essences. From the works of Goodman, Nāgārjuna, and Bohm, I put forward the idea that an aspiration for a greater good and fitting is more general than a desire for knowledge of entities, and that it is therefore important to be aware of the larger context in which any given entity appears so that it can be seen to what extent further inquiry and use of it can lead to a greater good and fitting.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:his-5137 |
Date | January 2011 |
Creators | Asadi, Dena |
Publisher | University of Skövde, School of Humanities and Informatics |
Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
Language | English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
Format | application/pdf |
Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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