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Government's choice of deterrence rate against piracy under asymmetric manufacturing costs

With the possibility of imitation, we discuss the pricing strategy of an inventor and the piracy-deterrence policy of a government. When inventor and imitator have asymmetric manufacturing costs, piracy may not be deterred by the government. When the inventor¡¦s cost of production is low enough, the inventor always stays in the market and the piracy only occurs if the social welfare is enhanced by the competition. When the inventor¡¦s cost of production is high, a monopoly market emerges and the identity of the monopolist, which can be the inventor or the imitator, is determined by the government through the piracy-deterrence policy such that the social welfare is maximized.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0904112-102042
Date04 September 2012
CreatorsChung, Shih-Chieh
ContributorsChun-Chieh Wang, Yung-Nian Tung, Shul-John Li
PublisherNSYSU
Source SetsNSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive
LanguageCholon
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
Sourcehttp://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0904112-102042
Rightsunrestricted, Copyright information available at source archive

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