The emergence of blockchain technology and increasing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) have created a new opportunity for peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading. However, challenges arise in such transactive markets to ensure individual rationality, incentive compatibility, budget balance, and economic efficiency during the trading process. This thesis creates an hour-ahead P2P energy trading network based on the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain and explores a comparative analysis of different auction mechanisms that form the basis of smart contracts. Considered auction mechanisms are discriminatory and uniform k-Double Auction with different k values. This thesis also investigates effects of four consumer and prosumer bidding strategies: random, preference factor, price-only game-theoretic approach, and supply-demand game-theoretic approach. A custom simulation framework that models the behavior of the transactive market is developed. Case studies of a 100-home microgrid at various photovoltaic (PV) penetration levels are presented using typical residential load and PV generation profiles in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area. Results indicate that regardless of PV penetration levels and employed bidding strategies, discriminatory k-DA can outperform uniform k-DA. Despite so, discriminatory k-DA is more sensitive to market conditions than uniform k-DA. Additionally, results show that the price-only game-theoretic bidding strategy leads to near-ideal economic efficiencies regardless of auction mechanisms and PV penetration levels. / MS
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VTETD/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/87563 |
Date | 08 February 2019 |
Creators | Lin, Jason |
Contributors | Electrical Engineering, Rahman, Saifur, Pipattanasomporn, Manisa, Yu, Guoqiang |
Publisher | Virginia Tech |
Source Sets | Virginia Tech Theses and Dissertation |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Thesis |
Format | ETD, application/pdf |
Rights | In Copyright, http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
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