The concept of the highest good is important to Kant because it serves to connect his rationalist ethics to religion. However, this concept entails a paradoxical treatment of the concept of happiness which some commentators believe strains Kant's rationalism. After discussing and assessing previous approaches to this problem in Kant's ethics, I develop a different line of argument against it. I draw upon Nietzsche's theory of valuation to demonstrate how Kant's treatment of reward and punishment, and, hence, of happiness, diverges from his rational principles. Such a line seems to prove more decisive than previous efforts, as I furthermore argue. This Nietzschean approach also suggests a novel perspective on the relation between Kant and Nietzsche.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UMASS/oai:scholarworks.umass.edu:dissertations-4949 |
| Date | 01 January 1988 |
| Creators | Schneier, Donald M |
| Publisher | ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst |
| Source Sets | University of Massachusetts, Amherst |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Source | Doctoral Dissertations Available from Proquest |
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