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Corporate governance in Germany : are there lessons to be learned from the United States?

In Germany, the role of shareholders in the structure of corporate governance has recently been the object of extensive discussion. Shareholder value has become a fashionable concept in the last few years, and some voices have demanded a stronger orientation of German corporations towards the consideration of shareholder value. Also, factual changes in the environment of the German corporate system have taken place. Germany faces major changes of the social security system that could encourage the emergence of private pension funds and modify the structure of share ownership. The capital market is gaining importance. A comparison of the historical development of the corporate legal system and the capital market provides some explanation for the differences in the corporate structure in Germany and the United States. A close examination of the present American system of corporate governance, which is known for the pursuit of shareholder value, will show, that despite similarities, there remain fundamental differences between the two systems, which will make the incorporation of shareholder value into the German system of corporate governance difficult.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.20985
Date January 1998
CreatorsBinder, Anette.
ContributorsStevens, David (advisor)
PublisherMcGill University
Source SetsLibrary and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeElectronic Thesis or Dissertation
Formatapplication/pdf
CoverageMaster of Laws (Institute of Comparative Law.)
RightsAll items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated.
Relationalephsysno: 001630946, proquestno: MQ50923, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest.

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