The empirical results indicate a strong positive link between three important elements: the duration as CEO, the market capitalization of the company and the non-executive ownership. Our findings also indicate an important but negative impact of two variables on the CEO compensation: the institutional and block holder shareholders. We also observed that there is no CEO pay-performance elasticity for the Total and base salary: the control variables do not have a significant impact on changes in CEO compensation. These results are in line with the ones of Ozkan (2011, p. 260-285). Those elements would demonstrate the active monitoring of these investors on the top management and especially on their remuneration. Those are also consistent with the paper of Khan et al. (2002, p. 1078-1088), which demonstrates the negative impact on CEO compensation of institutional ownerships when they are concentrated. Our study didn’t find a strong correlation between the other variables as the board size or sales for example and the level of remuneration of the CEO. That would mean that the number of member of the board doesn’t significantly impact the discussion about the CEO remuneration.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:umu-57327 |
| Date | January 2012 |
| Creators | Angibaud, Mathieu, Buan, Jérémy |
| Publisher | Umeå universitet, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Umeå universitet, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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