Dodd-Frank represents a federal intervention in corporate governance, which had previously been an issue for the states.The most prominent state in this respect is Delaware because of its favorable treatment of corporate interests.Although Delaware’s regulations are too lenient to encourage responsible risk management practices, the federal law is normally driven by populist outrage and anti-corporate sentiments that impair lawmakers’ abilities to write rational, efficient reforms.The climate of political pressure does not foster a thoughtful review of the best ways to affect risk management practices. This paper thus explores the role of leverage in the financial crisis, the shortcomings of Dodd-Frank’s capital requirements, the ways in which reform could have encouraged more responsible leverage positions, and the nature of federal corporate governance regulation.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:http://scholarship.claremont.edu/do/oai/:cmc_theses-1720 |
| Date | 01 January 2013 |
| Creators | Walker, Nina A |
| Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
| Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | CMC Senior Theses |
| Rights | © 2013 Nina A. Walker |
Page generated in 0.0016 seconds