<p>Chief executive officer’s (CEO) compensation and its optimal level is an interesting and important topic. How successful and skilled are shareholders monitoring and making changes in its level and its mix? Ownership dispersion is an important determinant of it. In this study we try to answer this question from the perspective of institutional shareholders as they hold a substantial part of equity in firms. The paper sheds light on institutional ownership dispersion effect on CEO total and cash compensation in Sweden.</p><p>Analysing data from the 26 largest companies listed on Stockholm Stock Exchange over the time period 2004 - 2008 we find that institutional ownership concentration decreases top executive officer’s total and cash compensation. We also find that small institutional shareholdings are positively associated with chief executive officer’s total and cash compensation. Overall this relationship suggests that institutions are powerful monitors of corporate governance.</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA/oai:DiVA.org:hgo-583 |
| Date | January 2010 |
| Creators | Khalatyan, Ashot, Jouri, Luay |
| Publisher | Gotland University, Institutionen för humaniora och samhällsvetenskap, Gotland University, Institutionen för humaniora och samhällsvetenskap |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, text |
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