This paper uses a search model with the product differentiation in a two-sided market. The two-sided market matches sellers with buyers. On the buyers' side it supplies some match information between the goods and the buyers. On the firms' side, it sells some empty slots to the firms. Any firm either takes a place in any platform or stays outside. Buyers search for a good either inside or outside the platform. Each search of the an outside firm is costly and gives the match information between the searcher (buyer) and the seller. We study two cases. In the first case, all buyers obtain the match information in the platform for free. The equilibrium price and profit of an inside firm drops in the number of inside firms. The monopoly platform, by adjusting the entrance fee, admit fewer firms under a higher search cost. If the market has two platforms, they generally admit more firms than the case with one platform. In the second case, the platform is able to impose a fee for all consumers who enter the platform. Our last result has indicated that the platform will register all buyers and firms.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CCSD/oai:tel.archives-ouvertes.fr:tel-00913206 |
| Date | 08 July 2013 |
| Creators | Song, Hui |
| Publisher | Université de Cergy Pontoise |
| Source Sets | CCSD theses-EN-ligne, France |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | PhD thesis |
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