Together, these three papers aim to develop scientifically informed accounts of the role of computation and representation in cognitive science. Along the way, they illustrate and defend a methodologically nominalist approach to the philosophy of cognitive science: one that investigates scientific explanation by setting aside any properties that scientific concepts might refer to, focusing instead on the concepts themselves and their role in cognitive science’s explanatory economy — what they help scientists to explain, and how. In addition to these philosophical upshots, the papers intervene on a number of debates within cognitive science itself.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:columbia.edu/oai:academiccommons.columbia.edu:10.7916/d61c-rk85 |
| Date | January 2022 |
| Creators | Richmond, Andrew |
| Source Sets | Columbia University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Theses |
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