Return to search

Third generation gangs revisited the Iraq insurgency

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited / The insurgency in Iraq has continued despite the determination of U.S. and Iraqi forces. U.S. counter-insurgent strategy has operated from the premise that the main thrust behind anti-U.S. activities is a combination of Sunnis desiring a return to their former privileged position and tribal collective actors with long-standing grievances fuelled by radical Islam. Yet an analysis incorporating insights from gang theory illuminates the diverse, practical, and local motivations of those involved in insurgent networks. Gang theory is uniquely suited to illuminate the street-level dynamics that drive insurgent violence. Through this, a more precise picture of the relevant networks and their operative motivations can be drawn, allowing finer tuned policies targeted to the differentiated factors behind non-state violence. I first consider the origins of and interactions between the armed groups operating in Iraq for discernable trends in development, paying particular attention to factors consistent with gang models. I then alter the gang model for the context of Iraq, and present an integrated model that articulates the likely effects of state-insurgent interaction on stability and security there. I conclude with recommendations demonstrating the model's relevance for strategic use in other regions.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:nps.edu/oai:calhoun.nps.edu:10945/2031
Date09 1900
CreatorsHaussler, Nicholas I.
ContributorsRussell, James, Baylouny, Anne Marie, Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)., Department of National Security Affairs
PublisherMonterey California. Naval Postgraduate School
Source SetsNaval Postgraduate School
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis
Formatxii, 113 p. : ill. (some. col.) ;, application/pdf
RightsApproved for public release, distribution unlimited

Page generated in 0.0017 seconds