Security protocols provide a communication architecture upon which security-sensitive distributed applications are built. Flaws in security protocols can expose applications to exploitation and manipulation. A number of formal analysis techniques have been applied to security protocols, with the ultimate goal of verifying whether or not a protocol fulfils its stated security requirements. These tools are limited in a number of ways. They are not fully automated and require considerable effort and expertise to operate. The specification languages often lack expressiveness. Furthermore the model checkers often cannot handle large industrial scale protocols due to the enormous number of states generated.Current research is addressing many of the limitations of the older tools by using state-of-the-art search optimisation and modelling techniques. This dissertation examines new ways in which industrial protocols can be analysed and presents abstract communication channels; a method for explicitly specifying assumptions made about the medium over which participants communicate.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/238556 |
| Creators | Plasto, Daniel |
| Publisher | ePublications@bond |
| Source Sets | Australiasian Digital Theses Program |
| Detected Language | English |
| Source | Theses |
Page generated in 0.0016 seconds