The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: Evidence from panel data

Description

Yes / We examine the effects of banking supervisory architecture on central bank preferences, quantified
through a recently proposed measure of central bank conservatism. Using a dynamic panel data specification we document that central banks serving both monetary policy and banking supervision functions are less inflation conservative than those with only a price stability mandate.

Links & Downloads

1. Chortareas G, Logothetis V, Magkonis G and Zekente K (2016) The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: evidence from panel data. Economics Letters. 140: 11-13.
2. http://hdl.handle.net/10454/8307
3. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021

Tags

Monetary policy

Banking supervision

Inflation conservatism

Panel data

Additional Fields

Identifer	oai:union.ndltd.org:BRADFORD/oai:bradscholars.brad.ac.uk:10454/8307
Date	01 November 2016
Creators	Chortareas, G., Logothetis, V., Magkonis, Georgios, Zekente, K.
Source Sets	Bradford Scholars
Language	English
Detected Language	English
Type	Article, Accepted manuscript
Rights	© 2016 Elsevier. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)