Philosophers of mind have recently debated over whether or not there exists a unique cognitive phenomenology – a “what it’s like”-ness to our conscious cognitive mental states. Most of these debates have centered on the ontological question of whether or not cognitive phenomenology exists. I suggest that assuming cognitive phenomenology does exist, it would have important consequences for other areas of philosophy. In particular, it would have important consequences for moral epistemology – how we come to know the moral truths we seem to know. I argue that adopting cognitive phenomenology and the epistemic principle of phenomenal conservatism can do “double duty” for the moral realist: they provide the moral realist with prima facie grounds for belief in the objectivity of morality, while epistemically vindicating the specific contents of their beliefs. / Master of Arts
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VTETD/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/73678 |
Date | 19 July 2016 |
Creators | Lennon, James Preston |
Contributors | Philosophy, Trogdon, Kelly Griffith, Klagge, James C., McPherson, Tristram |
Publisher | Virginia Tech |
Source Sets | Virginia Tech Theses and Dissertation |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Thesis |
Format | ETD, application/pdf |
Rights | In Copyright, http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
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