In this paper, I argue that pluralism about material constitution (i.e., holding that the relata of constitution can be non-identical) is a theoretically useful notion. First, I propose a principle whose denial is sufficient and, to my knowledge, necessary for pluralism to be true. Then I formulate three metaphysical antinomies (the problem of material constitution, the problem of change, and the problem of many) in such a way as to reveal that the previous principle is involved in all three. Then I show that the denial of the principle resolves all three of these problems. Finally, I conclude that pluralism is indeed theoretically useful on the basis of the following three points: 1) denying the mentioned principle is sufficient for pluralism to be correct, 2) denying the principle resolves three problems, and 3) by a theoretically useful notion I mean that if it were true it would solve multiple problems. / Master of Arts / There is a debate in philosophy about whether or not objects are identical to what makes them up. This paper argues that if we are to assume objects are not identical to what makes them up then many problems that have be written about in the literature dissipate. Thus, it is useful to believe that objects are not identical to what makes them up.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VTETD/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/86142 |
| Date | 31 May 2017 |
| Creators | Davies, Morgan Edward |
| Contributors | Philosophy, Trogdon, Kelly Griffith, Klagge, James C., Parent, Ted, Patton, Lydia K. |
| Publisher | Virginia Tech |
| Source Sets | Virginia Tech Theses and Dissertation |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | ETD, application/pdf |
| Rights | In Copyright, http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
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