康德在《單純理性範圍內的宗教》一書中非常重視「思慮品格」(Gesinnung)這個概念，並把它視為所有行動的「終極基本格準」。首先，他認為一個人或道德行動者為善或是惡取決於這種「傾向」。再者，「思慮品格」在康德的行動理論中亦扮演非常重要的角色，它解釋了理性行動者作惡的可能條件。故此，「思慮品格」是評價康德關於「根本惡」以及理性行動理論的重要概念。進一步說，「道德完整」的可能性以及「道德歷程」的可理解性也都建基於此概念。因此，「思慮品格」對於康德道德哲學的整體計劃而言也甚為關鍵。儘管康德在《道德底形上學之基礎》及《實踐理性批判》兩本書中曾數度提及「思慮品格」，但這概念在康德《單純理性範圍內的宗教》之前的著作中卻似未受到充分的重視。本文將要指出，康德並非在其後期作品中才突然提出「思慮品格」這概念，事實上，在許多較早的著作中，這個關鍵的概念早已留下重要的理論線索。 / 本文嘗試指出，康德在討論《實踐理性之批判》裡的「自由範疇」理論，特別是論及「道德人格」範疇時，早已舖排有關「思慮品格」的理論。「道德人格」範疇與「思慮品格」分別為道德罪責提供智性及心理根據，而後者正是以前者作為根據。對康德而言，「道德人格」並非一個心理概念，而是實踐判斷的先驗形式，正如「實體/屬性」這個在時間中連結不同直覺之基礎的「自然範疇」一般，作為它的同位範疇 (isomorphic category)，「道德人格」是關聯個別實踐判斷的基礎。然而，我們仍然需要解釋，行動的證成理由如何推動我們的意志，因為對「有限理性行動者」而言，純粹理性並不一定具有實踐性，或者說，一個行動的證成理由並不一定是我們的動力。康德正是以「思慮品格」這個概念來闡明採納「格準」的心理基礎。當我們釐清了採納「格準」的心理基礎後，便能明白人在甚麼意義下要為自己的行動負責。本文希望能夠清楚闡明「思慮品格」與「道德人格」的關係，更希望由此說明這兩個概念以及「自由範疇表」的理論關係，並對有關問題引起更多關注和討論。 / In religion within the limit of reason alone Kant deliberately proposes the concept Gesinnung and regards it as the “ultimate underlying maxim“ of all actions. Firstly, whether a certain person or a moral agent should be regarded as good or evil depends on this ‘disposition’. Moreover, Gesinnung assumes an important role in Kant's theory of action, namely to explain how it is possible for a rational agent to act evil. It is thus an important aspect of evaluating Kant's account of radical evil and rational agency. Furthermore, the possibility of moral integrity and the intelligibility of moral progress also lie in this concept, rendering it important also in Kant's whole project of moral philosophy. Although Gesinnung appears in Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason for a few times, very little had been said about the use of the term until Religion was written. It would be strange to for Kant to propose this important concept all of a sudden without any previous clues. I shall argue that the clues can already be found in the discussion of Categories of Freedom (the category of Personality) in the Critique of Practical Reason. This thesis aims to demonstrate that the category “personality“ and Gesinnung serve to provide the rational and psychological grounds of moral imputation respectively, and that the latter arises from the foundation built from the former. The category “personality“ is not a psychological concept but an a priori form of practical judgment: as isomorphic to the categories, “personality“ serves as the ground of relating discrete practical judgments just as “subsistence and inherence“ in categories of nature serves as the ground of relating intuitions in time. But we also need a psychological ground for moral imputation to explain how the justifying reason motivates our will, as for a finite rational agent pure reason may not always be practical, i.e. the justifying reasons for certain actions may not always be our motivation for the actions. Kant uses Gesinnung as a conceptual apparatus to explain the psychological ground for the adoption of maxims and hence how we impute our actions. Through this essay, I hope that I have explained the relation between Gesinnung and “personality“ clearly and more importantly, shown that the theoretical significance of these two concepts and the table of the Categories of Freedom deserve closer attention. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Ng, Yat Kan. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 120-121). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Table of contents --- p.v / Chapter 0.1 --- Prelude: structure of the essay --- p.1 / Chapter 1.01 --- Searching for the unchanged in the midst of changes- legacy of western philosophy --- p.3 / Chapter 1.1 --- Kant and the category of Subsistence and Inherence --- p.5 / Chapter 1.11 --- The ‘placement problem’ in the Categories of the Understanding --- p.5 / Chapter 1.111 --- Mathematical categories as a priori conditions of intuition --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2 --- “Substance and its transcendental time-determination --- p.15 / Chapter 1.3 --- Kant’s critique of the a-temporal treatment of Substance --- p.20 / Chapter 2 --- Kant’s on the problem of the personal identity: Transcendental “I“, Refutation of Idealism and brief remarks on “personality“ in the Critique of Pure Reason --- p.26 / Chapter 2.1 --- Transcendental apperception --- p.26 / Chapter 2.11 --- Kant’s refutation of idealism --- p.30 / Chapter 2.2 --- Preliminary remark: “Person and its genealogy --- p.38 / Chapter 2.21 --- Personality: Remarks from Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason --- p.41 / Chapter 3 --- Interlude: Brief accounts on the Moral Law and Autonomy --- p.45 / Chapter 3.1 --- The Moral Law 45 / Chapter 3.2 --- On autonomy: an explication on the role of “self“ in “self-legislation“ --- p.51 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Wood’s etymological mistake --- p.52 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Kant’s distinction on the “author and the “legislator“ of the law --- p.53 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Typic as a “procedure and the significance of “autos --- p.57 / Chapter 3.3 --- Intelligible noumenal character and the Empirical phenomenal character --- p.61 / Chapter 4 --- “Personality“ in Kant’s moral philosophy --- p.69 / Chapter 4.1 --- Overview of the problem --- p.69 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Categories of Freedom: a complete failure? --- p.71 / Chapter 4.3 --- “Personality as the “substratum of moral actions 85 / Chapter 5 --- The Analysis of the Will and Radical Evil --- p.94 / Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction: The Good Will and the Absolutely Good Will --- p.94 / Chapter 5.11 --- The Good and the Evil --- p.95 / Chapter 5.2 --- Autonomy part two: Wille and Willkür --- p.101 / Chapter 5.3 --- The Gesinnung --- p.104 / Chapter 5.31 --- Gesinnung and Personality: the psychological and rational grounds of moral imputation --- p.105 / Chapter 5.32 --- Gesinnung and Radical Evil --- p.110 / Chapter 6 --- Concluding remarks --- p.118 / Chapter 7 --- Bibliography --- p.120
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_328457 |
| Date | January 2012 |
| Contributors | Ng, Yat Kan., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Philosophy. |
| Source Sets | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
| Language | English, Chinese |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, bibliography |
| Format | electronic resource, electronic resource, remote, 1 online resource (vi, 121 leaves) |
| Rights | Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) |
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