<p>Bluetooth is the de facto standard for short-range wireless communications. Besides Bluetooth Classic (BC), Bluetooth also consists of Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) and Bluetooth Mesh (Mesh), two relatively new protocols, paving the way for its domination in the era of IoT and 5G. Meanwhile, attacks against Bluetooth, such as BlueBorne, BleedingBit, KNOB, BIAS, and BThack, have been booming in the past few years, impacting the security and privacy of billions of devices. These attacks exploit both design issues in the Bluetooth specification and vulnerabilities of its implementations, allowing for privilege escalation, remote code execution, breaking cryptography, spoofing, device tracking, etc.</p>
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<p>To secure Bluetooth, researchers have proposed different approaches for both Bluetooth specification (e.g., formal analysis) and implementation (e.g., fuzzing). However, existing analyses of the Bluetooth specification and implementations are either done manually, or the automatic approaches only cover a small part of the targets. As a consequence, current research is far from complete in securing Bluetooth.</p>
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<p>Therefore, in this dissertation, we propose the following research to provide missing pieces in prior research toward completing Bluetooth security research in terms of both Bluetooth specification and implementations. (i) For Bluetooth security at the specification level, we start from one protocol in Bluetooth, BLE, and focus on the previously unexplored reconnection procedure of two paired BLE devices. We conduct a formal analysis of this procedure defined in the BLE specification to provide security guarantees and identify new vulnerabilities that allow spoofing attacks. (ii) Besides BLE, we then formally verify other security-critical protocols in all Bluetooth protocols (BC, BLE, and Mesh). We provide a comprehensive formal analysis by covering the aspects that prior research fails to include (i.e., all possible combinations of protocols and protocol configurations) and considering a more realistic attacker model (i.e., semi-compromised device). With this model, we are able to rediscover five known vulnerabilities and reveal two new issues that affect BC/BLE dual-stack devices and Mesh devices, respectively. (iii) In addition to the formal analysis of specification security, we propose and build a comprehensive formal model to analyze Bluetooth privacy (i.e., device untraceability) at the specification level. In this model, we convert device untraceability into a reachability problem so that it can be verified using existing tools without introducing false results. We discover four new issues allowed in the specification that can lead to eight device tracking attacks. We also evaluate these attacks on 13 Bluetooth implementations and find that all of them are affected by at least two issues. (iv) At the implementation level, we improve Bluetooth security by debloating (i.e., removing code) Bluetooth stack implementations, which differs from prior automatic approaches, such as fuzzing. We keep only the code of needed functionality by a user and minimize their Bluetooth attack surface by removing unneeded Bluetooth features in both the host stack code and the firmware. Through debloating, we can remove 20 known CVEs and prevent a wide range of attacks again Bluetooth. With the research presented in this thesis, we improve Bluetooth security and privacy at both the specification and implementation levels.</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:purdue.edu/oai:figshare.com:article/23228561 |
| Date | 30 May 2023 |
| Creators | Jianliang Wu (15926933) |
| Source Sets | Purdue University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis |
| Rights | CC BY 4.0 |
| Relation | https://figshare.com/articles/thesis/thesis_pdf/23228561 |
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