Communicating bits over a network is expensive. Therefore, cryptosystems that transmit as little data as possible are valuable. This thesis studies several cryptosystems that require significantly less bandwidth than conventional analogues. The systems we study, called torus-based cryptosystems, were analyzed by Karl Rubin and Alice Silverberg in 2003 [RS03]. They interpreted the XTR [LV00] and LUC [SL93] cryptosystems in terms of quotients of algebraic tori and birational parameterizations, and they also presented CEILIDH, a new torus-based cryptosystem. This thesis introduces the geometry of algebraic tori, uses it to explain the XTR, LUC, and CEILIDH cryptosystems, and presents torus-based extensions of van Dijk, Woodruff, et al. [vDW04, vDGP<sup>+</sup>05] that require even less bandwidth. In addition, a new algorithm of Granger and Vercauteren [GV05] that attacks the security of torus-based cryptosystems is presented. Finally, we list some open research problems.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:WATERLOO/oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/1154 |
| Date | January 2005 |
| Creators | Alexander, Nicholas Charles |
| Publisher | University of Waterloo |
| Source Sets | University of Waterloo Electronic Theses Repository |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf, 1691444 bytes, application/pdf |
| Rights | Copyright: 2005, Alexander, Nicholas Charles. All rights reserved. |
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