Previous studies have concluded that mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) has not been successful in controlling the outcomes of the auditor-client relationship. Additionally, the literature concludes that high institutional ownership enhances audit quality through monitoring the management-auditor relationship. This paper hypothesizes that better corporate governance in terms of high institutional ownership percentage will enhance audit quality during a MAFR regime. Since countries that have implemented MAFR in the past have their data in their local languages, I use the special case of Arthur Andersen clients based in the US as my treatment group. I carry out a descriptive statistical analysis and run linear OLS regressions with discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality as my dependent variable. Results suggest that the percentage of institutional ownership does not have a significant impact on audit quality in a MAFR regime.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:cmc_theses-3003 |
| Date | 01 January 2018 |
| Creators | Shah, Latisha |
| Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
| Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | CMC Senior Theses |
| Rights | 2018LatishaRShah |
Page generated in 0.002 seconds