This thesis examines a primary question raised by both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas: What constitutes the beginning of a human being? Aristotle and Aquinas raise this question for very different reasons. Modern critical commentators revisit it for their own reasons, namely for the purposes of ethical debates surrounding conception and abortion. They frequently attribute the notions of delayed ensoulment and quickening to Aristotle. Through examination of the primary texts, I demonstrate that this attribution is erroneous. Aristotle contends that ensoulment is substantially complete at conception, though subject to gradual actualization throughout the lifespan of a human being; while Thomas suggests that conception is a process, requiring several substantial changes before a human soul is infused. I argue that Aquinas adapts Aristotle in accordance with his Christian theological commitments, and modern commentators follow him to develop their own notions of delayed ensoulment and quickening.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.79819 |
| Date | January 2003 |
| Creators | Austin, Kathleen J. |
| Contributors | Kirby, T. (advisor), Deslauriers, M. (advisor) |
| Publisher | McGill University |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Coverage | Master of Arts (Faculty of Religious Studies.) |
| Rights | All items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. |
| Relation | alephsysno: 002089655, proquestno: AAIMQ98411, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest. |
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