Alongside the ever increasing traffic demand, the fifth generation (5G) cellular network architecture is being proposed to provide better quality of service, increased data rate, decreased latency, and increased capacity. Without any doubt, the 5G cellular network will comprise of ultra-dense networks and multiple input multiple output technologies. This will make the current centralised solutions impractical due to increased complexity. Moreover, the amount of coordination information that needs to be transported over the backhaul links will be increased. Distributed or decentralised solutions are promising to provide better alternatives. This thesis proposes new distributed algorithms for wireless networks which aim to reduce the amount of system overheads in the backhaul links and the system complexity. The analysis of conflicts amongst transmitters, and resource allocation are conducted via the use of game theory, convex optimisation, and auction theory. Firstly, game-theoretic model is used to analyse a mixed quality of service (QoS) strategic non-cooperative game (SNG), for a two-user multiple-input single-output (MISO) interference channel. The players are considered to have different objectives. Following this, the mixed QoS SNG is extended to a multicell multiuser network in terms of signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) requirement. In the multicell multiuser setting, each transmitter is assumed to be serving real time users (RTUs) and non-real time users (NRTUs), simultaneously. A novel mixed QoS SNG algorithm is proposed, with its operating point identified as the Nash equilibrium-mixed QoS (NE-mixed QoS). Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky, and Egalitarian bargain solutions are then proposed to improve the performance of the NE-mixed QoS. The performance of the bargain solutions are observed to be comparable to the centralised solutions. Secondly, user offloading and user association problems are addressed for small cells using auction theory. The main base station wishes to offload some of its users to privately owned small cell access points. A novel bid-wait-auction (BWA) algorithm, which allows single-item bidding at each auction round, is designed to decompose the combinatorial mathematical nature of the problem. An analysis on the existence and uniqueness of the dominant strategy equilibrium is conducted. The BWA is then used to form the forward BWA (FBWA) and the backward BWA (BBWA). It is observed that the BBWA allows more users to be admitted as compared to the FBWA. Finally, simultaneous multiple-round ascending auction (SMRA), altered SMRA (ASMRA), sequential combinatorial auction with item bidding (SCAIB), and repetitive combinatorial auction with item bidding (RCAIB) algorithms are proposed to perform user offloading and user association for small cells. These algorithms are able to allow bundle bidding. It is then proven that, truthful bidding is individually rational and leads to Walrasian equilibrium. The performance of the proposed auction based algorithms is evaluated. It is observed that the proposed algorithms match the performance of the centralised solutions when the guest users have low target rates. The SCAIB algorithm is shown to be the most preferred as it provides high admission rate and competitive revenue to the bidders.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:706196 |
| Date | January 2016 |
| Creators | Basutli, Bokamoso |
| Publisher | Loughborough University |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/23325 |
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