Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts in International Relations to the Faculty of Humanities,
University of the Witwatersrand Johannesburg, 2016 / Natural resources can be a solution to the capital deficit in sub Saharan Africa. As
such, resource rich countries have to avoid plundering and wastage of the resource
rents. However, the nature of politics in the region points to the fact that
plundering of resource rents is inevitable because most resource rich sub Saharan
African countries have been prone to elite capture and bad governance. This
entails that national resources are “privatised” in the sense that they are directed
towards enrichment of a few. In addition, governments in resource rich countries
tend to allocate resource rents inefficiently. Thus, resources do not contribute
towards sustainable and long-term development. To avoid plundering and wastage,
a set of institutions can be put in place that can assist in managing resource rents.
These are institutions that can restrain ruling elites from capturing the resource
rents for private use and the state from inefficiently allocating rents through
policies. Most scholars argue that a democratic system, through frequent elections
and its attendant institutions such as the rule of law, accountability and
transparency allows effective and efficient management resource rents and the
economy in general. This is a good starting point in conceptualising institutions of
restraint. However, this study seeks to broaden our understanding of institutions
of restraint by providing an alternative approach.
Using Botswana and Namibia as case studies this study seeks to reconceptualise
institutions of restraint without rejecting the importance of democratic institutions.
The study considers the hypothesis that the success in management of resource
rents, particularly in Botswana, can be explained by a combination of democratic
institutions and what can be termed centralised development planning institutions.
The premise of this proposition is that democratic institutions are inadequate in
restraining elites or the state. Therefore, they need to be complemented by
centralised development planning institutions. Working in tandem, democratic
institutions and centralised development planning institutions have the capacity to
adequately provide the necessary restraints in resource driven economies. In line
with this, the study argues that the degree or level of restraints in a political system
is essential for successful management of resource rents. / MT2017
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:wits/oai:wiredspace.wits.ac.za:10539/21884 |
| Date | January 2016 |
| Creators | Moyo, Kudzai Tamuka |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | Online resource (89 leaves), application/pdf, application/pdf |
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