Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2018. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references. / This thesis consists of three chapters on inequality, interest rates and macroeconomic policies. The first chapter explores the macroeconomic consequences of the recent rise in permanent income inequality. First, I show that in many common macroeconomic models consumption is a linear function of permanent (labor) income. This implies that macroeconomic aggregates are neutral with respect to shifts in the distribution of permanent income. Motivated by this neutrality result, I develop novel approaches to test for linearity in U.S. household panel data. The estimates suggest an elasticity of 0.7, soundly rejecting linearity. I quantify the effects of this deviation from neutrality using a novel non-homothetic precautionary-savings model. In the model, the rise in U.S. permanent labor income inequality since the 1970s caused: (a) a decline in real interest rates of around 1%; (b) an increase in the wealth-to-GDP ratio of around 30%; (c) wealth inequality to rise almost as rapidly as it did in the data. The second chapter, joint with Sebastián Fanelli, develops a theory of foreign exchange interventions in a small open economy with limited capital mobility between home and foreign bond markets. Due to limited capital mobility, the central bank can implement nonzero bond spreads by managing its portfolio. Crucially, spreads are inherently costly as they allow foreign intermediaries to make carry-trade profits. Optimal interventions balance these costs with terms of trade benefits. We show that they lean against the wind of global capital flows to avoid excessive currency appreciation. Due to the convexity of the costs, interventions should be small and spread out, relying on credible promises (forward guidance) of future interventions. By contrast, excessive smoothing of the exchange rate path may create large spreads, inviting costly speculation. Finally, in a multi-country extension of our model, we find that the decentralized equilibrium features too much reserve accumulation and too low world interest rates, highlighting the importance of policy coordination. The third chapter, joint with Iván Werning, reconsiders the well-known Chamley-Judd result, according to which capital should not be taxed in the long run. For the main model in Judd (1985), we prove that the long run tax on capital is positive and significant, whenever the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is below one. The main model in Chamley (1986) imposes an upper bound on capital taxes. We provide conditions under which these constraints bind forever, implying positive long run taxes. When this is not the case, the long-run tax may be zero. However, if preferences are recursive and discounting is locally non-constant (e.g., not additively separable over time), a zero long-run capital tax limit must be accompanied by zero private wealth (zero tax base) or by zero labor taxes (first best). Finally, we explain why the equivalence of a positive capital tax with ever increasing consumption taxes does not provide a firm rationale against capital taxation. / by Ludwig Straub. / Ph. D.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:MIT/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/118064 |
| Date | January 2018 |
| Creators | Straub, Ludwig (Ludwig Wilhelm) |
| Contributors | Iván Werning and Jonathan A. Parker., Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics., Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics. |
| Publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| Source Sets | M.I.T. Theses and Dissertation |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 284 pages, application/pdf |
| Rights | MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission., http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 |
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