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Disability & Justice: The Practice of Egalitarian Thought

In what follows, I engage in a wide-ranging discussion that captures the components of a metric of egalitarian justice (that is, the nature of the principles that specify what we aim to distribute equally) best designed to promote a minimally just state of affairs for not only, but principally, people with disabilities.
First, I examine precisely what it is we mean when we refer to “disability”. I do this to ensure we have adequately deliberated over, and subsequently identified, the particular group of individuals for whom we aim to promote justice. I conclude this section by endorsing the so-called ‘interactional model’ of disability, and denying the accuracy of the ‘social model’.
Second, I argue that while a focus on the capabilities approach can help provide us with an answer to the currency question that most closely approximates justice for the disabled, a minimally just state of affairs would nevertheless, fail to materialize should we opt to endorse such a conception of egalitarian justice. I point to the inability of the capabilities approach to: i) accurately identify and calculate degrees of need or injustice; ii) be adequately sensitive to the diverse natural endowments when assessing need; iii) acknowledge the special moral importance of health as well as various other functionings.
Finally, I conclude that a focus on first and foremost, condition, rather than opportunity, can better weather the challenges I present against a capabilities framework. More specifically, I suspect that a focus on both material conditions, and substantive freedoms or opportunities, is necessary to provide an adequate minimal conception of justice. I will argue that there are a set of material conditions that are lexically prior to a group of opportunities that must also be afforded within a conception of justice, and that merely providing the opportunities for these conditions is inadequate.
In other words, I suggest that there are indeed, some functionings that must be assured within a minimal conception of justice, regardless of the choices exercised surrounding the securing of those functionings. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2012-03-14 12:43:02.176

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:OKQ.1974/7033
Date14 March 2012
CreatorsRIDDLE, CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER
ContributorsQueen's University (Kingston, Ont.). Theses (Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.))
Source SetsLibrary and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada
LanguageEnglish, English
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis
RightsThis publication is made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws without written authority from the copyright owner.
RelationCanadian theses

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