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Reaction mechanism for packet size-based misbehavior in wireless networks

Since the field of wireless technology is growing rapidly, security is becoming a major
concern. A variety of security problems are being addressed, and much research work is taking
place in order to provide adequate security to prevent hackers from disrupting network service.
Wireless networks follow the IEEE 802.11 standard to transmit and receive packets. The IEEE
802.11 MAC protocol is designed in such a way to provide an equal share of throughput among
all nodes in a network. Users who misbehave could modify the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol, thus
causing major security threats including substantial bandwidth degradation of other users.
This thesis addresses the misbehavior of a node caused by altering the packet size. For a
node to acquire higher throughput compared to other genuine nodes in the network, its packet
size could be set higher than that of the genuine nodes. In order to protect against this sort of
misbehavior, a special algorithm, which is a slight modification of the IEEE 802.11 MAC
protocol, was developed.
This algorithm is based on the notion of receiver-assigned backoff, which has already
been used to deal with other types of misbehavior. The packet size-based misbehavior was
modeled mathematically using queuing theory, and an appropriate reaction strategy was deduced
from the analytical results. It was shown that the proposed approach reduces the effectiveness of
misbehavior and leads to fairness in the network. / Thesis (M.S.)--Wichita State University, College of Engineering, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:WICHITA/oai:soar.wichita.edu:10057/3954
Date05 1900
CreatorsGovindarajulu, Sree Sharanya
ContributorsJaggi, Neeraj
PublisherWichita State University
Source SetsWichita State University
Languageen_US
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis
Formatxii, 71 p.
Rights©Copyright 2010 by Sree Sharanya Govindarajulu. All rights reserved

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