The theory of affections has seen a renewed
conceptual interest both in the role played
in the formulation of power structures in
modernity, which remains important in
understanding the present form of Nation
State, and in the possibility to formulate a
new interpretation of the social relationship
useful to surpass the classical psychological
lectures.
We aim here to reconsider an affect which
in contemporary language is tinged with
theological nuances: the affect of fides. We
can translate the word using the modern
terms of trust and belief, but also loyalty.
The choice of this particular affect is due to
the centrality that, in our view, it occupies
in modern contract theories, and to its ability
to reflect, with its multiple conceptual
stratification, different perspectives and
political proposals. In order to clarify the
terms of this discussion, we will henceforth
use the term fides, alongside with different
meanings which overlap within it, to illustrate
two different and divergent proposals
that have emerged during the seventeenth
century. We consider, in particular, the
thought of Spinoza opposed to the social
contract theories by Hobbes in order to
understand the modern theoretical break
with previous political concepts; in particular,
we will briefly analyze the different
conceptions of Societas civilis that emerge
from this division.
The background of these considerations is
the analysis of modern philosophy‘s use of
the theory of affections.
The XVII century witnessed the rise of social
contract theory. It draws on the concept
of the individual, conceived as isolated
from others, located in the original state of
nature (pre-social), unable to develop its
rational part. It is therefore a victim of its
own passions, but even more so those of
others. The dominant sentiments emerging
in Hobbes‘ Leviathan are therefore
those of awe and fear. They derive from the
constant uncertainty of one‘s power and
strength; the uncertainty of being able to
maintain everyone‘s domination over others
and thus to suffer in turn the others‘
power. From the necessity to control these
emotions in a rational way emerges the
contractual proposal to transfer the power
to an authority (singular or plural) whom
all subjects must obey.
Philosophical movements such as neostoicism
and philosophical works such as
Les passions de l‘ame by Descartes, testify
in their „rationalist“ proposal the need to
keep a constant control over the passions.
They open the way for the famous dialectics
of reason and passion, a central theme
throughout the Enlightenment. This need
to dominate the passions arouses from the
complex Cartesian metaphysical theory
and from its conception of the individual
always split between body and soul, reason
and instinct.
These two models are the ones which have
prevailed; this conception of individual and
society and this approach to the passions
still dominate common sense when we talk
about human affections.
The paper follows an itinerary across three
authors of the modern age. At first we try
to delineate the theory of affection by Descartes,
and the birth of the dichotomy of
body and soul through the focus of two of
the most important works by Descartes:
Méditations métaphysiques and Traité sur
les passions de l‘âme. Then, by analyzing
the works of Hobbes (Leviathan), and Spinoza
(Ethic and Political treatise) we will
describe in which terms the subject carrying
his affective baggage interacts in a political
space.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:DRESDEN/oai:qucosa:de:qucosa:16917 |
| Date | 20 February 2018 |
| Creators | Ricci, Rosa |
| Source Sets | Hochschulschriftenserver (HSSS) der SLUB Dresden |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion, doc-type:article, info:eu-repo/semantics/article, doc-type:Text |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Relation | urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa2-168675, qucosa:16867 |
Page generated in 0.0022 seconds