This research explores the French environmental governance framework, and endeavors to establish the implications of its highly centralized structure for the management of common-pool resources (CPRs), by studying in detail the opportunities for administrative and decisional power at the local level. The study employs Elinor Ostrom’s eight design principles for sustainable CPR governance as a benchmark to evaluate the institutions surrounding two resources: water and nature reserves. The results reveal that despite these resources being under strong management, their governance remains centralized, with a distribution of power from the top-down, that limits the agency of local authorities and resource users to create institutions or devise operational rules for their resources. These institutional blockages deter local initiatives and deny local resource users the possibility of a more appropriate and flexible management of their CPRs, both notable outcomes of collaborative governance according to Ostrom. Economic interests are often found to take precedence over environmental concerns, and stakeholder engagement is sometimes inadequate, leading to a weakening of legitimacy and costs shouldered by local ecosystems. Thus, the study concludes that France must continue its journey towards decentralization, enhance the autonomy of localities, and improve its performance in transparent democracy in order to achieve more sustainable CPR institutions.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-530571 |
| Date | January 2024 |
| Creators | Quilan, Romane |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för geovetenskaper |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Relation | Examensarbete vid Institutionen för geovetenskaper, 1650-6553 ; 2024/17 |
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