Several experimental studies show that ex post communication mitigates opportunistic behavior
in social dilemmas. The source of this effect, especially in a repeated interaction, is nonetheless still obscure. This study provides a novel empirical testbed for two channels by which ex post communication may affect behavior in a repeated public goods game. One is related to strategic signaling. The other involves emotions induced by others' expressed disapproval. The presence of ex post communication strongly fosters pro-social behavior. The data
do not support the signaling hypothesis, favouring the emotion-based explanation instead. (author's abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VIENNA/oai:epub.wu-wien.ac.at:4075 |
| Date | 01 1900 |
| Creators | Zylbersztejn, Adam |
| Publisher | WU Vienna University of Economics and Business |
| Source Sets | Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Paper, NonPeerReviewed |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Relation | http://www.wu.ac.at/economics/forschung/wp, http://epub.wu.ac.at/4075/ |
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