Reverse auctions for ecological goods and services are an alternative to current agri-environmental government programs to provide incentives for farmers. This thesis reports on a testbed of laboratory auction experiments to assess efficiency and cost effectiveness of different design treatments. These were developed using estimated costs of wetland restoration in southern Manitoba. The testbed included a comparison of payment type (discriminatory versus uniform payments), and ranking rule for both budget based and target based auctions over repeated auction rounds and reserve prices for the target based auctions. It was found that 1) uniform payments outperformed discriminatory payments under a budget constraint, 2) discriminatory payments were superior to uniform payments under a target constraint, 3) where there is no budget constraint a reserve price can greatly increase efficiency and cost effectiveness. These findings highlight the complexity of auction design and may be used as an aid to guide policy decisions and agri-environmental program design. / Agricultural and Resource Economics
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:AEU.10048/1434 |
| Date | 11 1900 |
| Creators | Packman, Katherine |
| Contributors | Boxall, Peter (Rural Economy), Dridi, Chokri (Rural Economy), Weber, Marian (Alberta Research Council), Bork, Edward (Agricultural, Food and Nutritional Science) |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 1326085 bytes, application/pdf |
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