We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce
compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders
of TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in
compliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk
salient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance on aggregate. However, the information condition has a weak positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. (authors' abstract)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VIENNA/oai:epub.wu-wien.ac.at:4137 |
| Date | 03 June 2013 |
| Creators | Fellner, Gerlinde, Sausgruber, Rupert, Traxler, Christian |
| Publisher | Wiley |
| Source Sets | Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Article, PeerReviewed |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Relation | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12013, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/, http://epub.wu.ac.at/4137/ |
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