This essay aims to critically discuss John Rawls’ theory of “Justice as Fairness” with prime focus on Rawls’ view of the family and its role in a politically just society. Feminist critics, Susan Moller Okin and others, have suggested that Rawls’ theory fails to address issues of gender structured inequalities in society and within families. Starting from the question of what potential Rawls’ theory has as philosophical framework for just family conditions and family policy, and with support from Okin’s criticism and the critical comments presented by Charles W. Mills, concerning Rawls’ omission of issues of racial oppression, I argue that there are two particularly significant problems with Rawls’ theory when applied as basis for family policy aimed at promoting equal rights and opportunities for all individuals, men and women: (1) That Rawls fails with his intention, to free the conditions that the theory is derived from, from impact of actual political and social structures and (2) that Rawls fails to define the balance between the family’s (in this context) double roles; as an autonomous association and as a part of the society’s basic (political) structure. I also discuss an alternative interpretation of Rawls’ theory, which suggests that the theory benefits from a built-in flexibility in dealing with the private and public spheres of life and thereby manages both to promote diversity and autonomy and to oppose patriarchal hierarchies.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:sh-38360 |
| Date | January 2019 |
| Creators | Fransson, Rasmus |
| Publisher | Södertörns högskola, Filosofi |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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