In this thesis, I argue for the hypothesis that a minimal moral decency is in fact a criterion for livinga meaningful life. To argue that point I present four different arguments about the relation between morality and a meaningful life. These four arguments are grounded in different forms of theories that discuss the concept and conceptions of meaning and a meaningful life. The four arguments are built on the philosophies of: John Cottingham, Laurence Thomas, Susan Wolf and Thaddeus Metz. Two of the arguments are in favor of morality being a criterion for a meaningful life while the other two are against it. The most powerful argument against morality being a part of a meaningful life is built on Metz fundamentality theory which is presented last in the thesis. When we look closer upon Metz description of anti-matter, which can be considered to be the opposite of meaning, come to the conclusion that when avoiding certain anti-matter we live lives with a minimal form of moral decency. The conclusion of this thesis is that a minimal moral decency is in fact a criterion for a meaningful life.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:umu-140405 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Creators | Öhman Mägi, Daniel |
| Publisher | Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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