A thought experiment by Avicenna known as the Flying man presents a hypothetical man in the air who is not aware of the existence of his body but simultaneously is aware of himself. A common objection to the Flying Man accuses Avicenna of committing an epistemic and logical fallacy known as the Masked Man. This paper analyses the two most recent interpretations of the Flying Man thought experiment, where each interpretation attempts to understand the main argument which Avicenna poses through the thought experiment. On one hand, I will examine Peter Adamson and Fedor Benevich’s interpretation, which rejects previous criticisms of the Flying Man with an emphasis on Avicenna’s philosophy of essences. I will, on the other hand, present Jari Kaukua’s interpretation; a response to Adamson and Benevich’s interpretation with two closely related objections. The last section of this paper discusses and evaluates the scholars’ debated points and offers a more charitable interpretation of the Flying Man through my suggestive indicative method.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-515029 |
| Date | January 2023 |
| Creators | Altounji, Dalal |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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