In the first part of the thesis I focus on credit markets in developing countries, and describe the competitive interaction between Microfinance Institutions (MFIs).
Microfinance has recently attracted a lot of attention from investors, politicians, scholars and, most of all, people working on development. As a results, a huge number of MFIs are being created all over the world so that, as of today, practitioners reckon that about 100 millions of customers are being served. Remarkably, about 67% of them are women.
The reason of this extraordinary effort is that Microfinance is considered the most promising development tool currently available. This belief is based on two important features of Microfinance: (i) It promises to be financially viable (and in some cases even profitable) since poor people have proven to be reliable clients. As a result, Microfinance is potentially a zero-cost development tool. (ii) It hinges on the entrepreneurial abilities of the poor. It is designed to help the poor to help themselves, in their own home countries, by allowing them to use their skills, ideas and potentials. This should progressively make developing countries independent of rich ones' help.
The growth of Microfinance has been so fast that many issues and related research questions are still not answered. In my thesis I try to address one of them, that I believe particularly important: the increase of competition between MFIs. As economic theory predicts, competition can have dramatic consequences in terms of borrower welfare, profitability of the institutions and, therefore, on the attractiveness of the business for potential investors, donors and entrants. I use the tools of industrial organization and contract theory to understand these effects, measure them, and give some interesting policy advice.
In the first paper, I analyze the effects of entry of a new MFI in a previously monopolistic microcredit market. In order to catch the salient features of financial markets in developing countries, I use a model of asymmetric information and assume that institutions can offer only one type of contract. I consider different behavioral assumptions for the MFIs and study their influence on equilibrium predictions. The model allows showing that competition can lead to equilibria in which MFIs differentiate their contracts in order to screen borrowers. This process can, unfortunately, make the poor borrowers worse off. Interestingly, the screening process we describe creates a previously unexplored source of credit rationing. I also prove that the presence in the market of an altruistic MFI, reduces rationing and, via this channel, affects positively the competitor's profit.
In the second paper, I study the effects of competition in those markets in which, due to the absence of credit bureaus, small entrepreneurs can simultaneously borrow from more than one institution. As in the first paper, I analyze an oligopolistic microcredit market characterized by asymmetric information and institutions that can offer only one type of contract. The main contribution is to show that appropriate contract design can eliminate the ex-ante incentives for multiple borrowing. Moreover, when the market is still largely unserved and particularly risky, a screening strategy leading to con-
tract differentiation and credit rationing is unambiguously the most effective to avoid multiple borrowing. The result of this paper can also be read as important robustness checks of the findings of my first paper.
In the last part of the thesis, I depart from the analysis of developing countries to consider, more generally, the corporate governance of financial infrastructures. The efficient functioning of financial markets relies more and more on the presence of infrastructures providing services like clearing, settlement, messaging and many others. The last years have been characterized by interesting dynamics in the ownership regime of these service providers. Both mutualizations and de-mutualizations took place, together with entry and exit of different players.
Starting from this observation, in the last paper (with Joachim Keller), we analyze the effects of competitive interaction between differently owned financial providers. We mainly focus on the incentives to invest in safety enhancing measures and we describe the different equilibrium market configurations. We use a model in which agents need an input service for the financial market they operate in. They can decide whether to provide it them selves by forming a Cooperative or outsource it from a Third Party Provider. We prove that the co-existence of differently governed infrastructures leads to a significant reduction in the investment in safety. In most cases, monopolistic provision is preferable to competition. Moreover, the decision rule used within the Cooperative plays a central role in determining the optimal market configuration.
All in all, throughout my thesis, I use the tools of industrial organization and contract theory to model the competitive interaction of the different actors operating in financial markets. Understanding the dynamics typical of developing countries can help in gaining a deeper comprehension of the markets in richer countries, and vice-versa. I am convinced that analyzing the differences and the similarities of financial markets in different regions of the world can be of great importance for economic theorists, in that it provides a counterfactual for the assumptions and the results on which our predictions and policy advices are based.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:BICfB/oai:ulb.ac.be:ETDULB:ULBetd-02022010-192753 |
| Date | 16 February 2010 |
| Creators | Casini, Paolo |
| Contributors | Dewatripont Mathias, Kirchsteiger Georg, Mitchell Janet, Cantillon Estelle, Baland Jean-Marie, Ginsburgh Victor |
| Publisher | Universite Libre de Bruxelles |
| Source Sets | Bibliothèque interuniversitaire de la Communauté française de Belgique |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://theses.ulb.ac.be/ETD-db/collection/available/ULBetd-02022010-192753/ |
| Rights | unrestricted, J'accepte que le texte de la thèse (ci-après l'oeuvre), sous réserve des parties couvertes par la confidentialité, soit publié dans le recueil électronique des thèses ULB. A cette fin, je donne licence à ULB : - le droit de fixer et de reproduire l'oeuvre sur support électronique : logiciel ETD/db - le droit de communiquer l'oeuvre au public Cette licence, gratuite et non exclusive, est valable pour toute la durée de la propriété littéraire et artistique, y compris ses éventuelles prolongations, et pour le monde entier. Je conserve tous les autres droits pour la reproduction et la communication de la thèse, ainsi que le droit de l'utiliser dans de futurs travaux. Je certifie avoir obtenu, conformément à la législation sur le droit d'auteur et aux exigences du droit à l'image, toutes les autorisations nécessaires à la reproduction dans ma thèse d'images, de textes, et/ou de toute oeuvre protégés par le droit d'auteur, et avoir obtenu les autorisations nécessaires à leur communication à des tiers. Au cas où un tiers est titulaire d'un droit de propriété intellectuelle sur tout ou partie de ma thèse, je certifie avoir obtenu son autorisation écrite pour l'exercice des droits mentionnés ci-dessus. |
Page generated in 0.0028 seconds