This dissertation addresses three important questions surrounding the politics of foreign aid, namely what leads to its provisions by donor countries, and what are some of its consequences on those receiving it. Using arguments rooted in political economy models and large-N statistics, this dissertation provides three core findings: (i) Foreign aid can be driven by heterogenous motives in the donor country. (ii) This heterogeneity determines whether a donor lives up to the promises over foreign aid that it makes. (iii) Inflows of foreign aid tend to restrain the government’s propensity to engage in killings.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:RICE/oai:scholarship.rice.edu:1911/71963 |
| Date | 16 September 2013 |
| Creators | Heinrich, Tobias |
| Contributors | Morgan, T. Clifton |
| Source Sets | Rice University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | thesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
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