From 1981 to 1986, the Reagan administration viewed Nicaragua's Marxist regime as a threat to regional and U.S. national security. The administration's support of the Contra rebels, who were actively fighting to overthrow Nicaragua's government, embroiled the U.S. in a "limited" regional war. While conventional scholarship has characterized this conflict as "Reagan's War", Congress played a significant role in keeping the Contra army active and intact. Caught between Reagan's strident anti-Communist ideology and the fear of a Marxist state in Central America, Congress attempted to establish a middle-of-the-road policy, first cautiously funding the Contras through covert operations and non-lethal aid, finally approving full military support in 1986. Despite opportunities to end U.S. involvement, Congress failed to curb both military escalation and Reagan's ideological ambitions. Ultimately, responsibility for U.S. involvement in the Contra war does not lie solely with the White House; this burden must also be shared by Congress.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.101882 |
| Date | January 2007 |
| Creators | Holm, Michael, 1975- |
| Publisher | McGill University |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Coverage | Master of Arts (Department of History.) |
| Rights | © Michael Holm, 2007 |
| Relation | alephsysno: 002668867, proquestno: AAIMR38452, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest. |
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