A new operationalization was used to model a schema-based approach to moral judgment, as well as compare it to predictions based on the Social Intuitionist Model. Judgments were made about the moral wrongness of killing different animals. At Time 1, only moral judgments were made. At Time 2 judgments were made again, with questions and scales relating to attributing morally relevant cognitive capacities also included; further, two randomized conditions varied the presentation order of the scales. Differences between Time 1 and 2 indicated a reversed perspective-taking effect, with animals of lower capacities rated less empathically at Time 2. Affective ratings and attributed capacities were compared as different predictors, showing attributed capacities being more powerful. A group comparison was also made between active animal rights proponents and non-proponents, showing differences on several factors. These and other findings are discussed with relation to the Social Intuitionist Model and a schema-based account of morality.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:su-100136 |
| Date | January 2013 |
| Creators | Andersson, Per |
| Publisher | Stockholms universitet, Psykologiska institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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