This article discusses the potential role of incentive systems in combating bribery. In particular,
it uses an agency theory approach to show how a combination of bonus and malus
payments could help to eliminate bribery in multinational corporations. Expert interviews
with 35 anti-bribery specialists from Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland
were conducted and analyzed through qualitative content analysis. It was found that employees
should be rewarded for both productivity and compliance. In addition, performance
should be measured in a matrix and whistleblowers should receive a bonus for reporting
undesired behavior. Conversely, significant risks associated with incentives for whistleblowing
were also identified. Whilst the empirical findings focus on Europe, their implications
could be applied globally.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:DRESDEN/oai:qucosa:de:qucosa:32048 |
| Date | 26 October 2018 |
| Creators | Teichmann, Fabian M. |
| Publisher | Universität Leipzig, University of Miami |
| Source Sets | Hochschulschriftenserver (HSSS) der SLUB Dresden |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion, doc-type:article, info:eu-repo/semantics/article, doc-type:Text |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Relation | urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa2-320423, qucosa:32042 |
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