Thesis (PhD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this thesis an attempt is made to sketch the outlines of a cognitive theory of ethics,
i.e. a theory in which ethical statements are a subset of descriptive statements. It is
argued that the good is a quale, and that this quale roughly corresponds to what is
often referred to as "pleasure". If this conceptualisation of the good is correct, then the
resulting ethical theory is a cognitive, egoist version of ethical hedonism. The thesis
proceeds by relating this conceptualisation of the good to economic phenomena. An
investigation is then made of the conditions under which the following of a boundedly
rational rule is preferable to calculating which one of the possible options available to
the actor to follow. It is argued that one such rule is that "truth" should serve as a
norm of inquiry. Next the issue of "altruism" is considered. It is argued that our
intuitions regarding what egoist action should be are radically untrustworthy.
Considerations from evolutionary biology and game theory make it clear that an
egoist actor might well be best advised to perform a number of actions that would
normally be termed altruistic. The next topic concerns the relation between fact and
value. Arguments that claim to undermine the distinction between fact and value are
argued to be fallacious. It is also argued that the correct view of the relation between
fact and value can help to clarify some of the problems surrounding the
conceptualisation of "objectivity". The thesis ends by considering the gains that arise
from adopting the position argued for. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie tesis word 'n poging aangewend om 'n kognitiwe teorie van etiek, m.a.w 'n
teorie waarbinne etiese stellings 'n subspesie van deskriptiewe stellings is, daar te stel.
Daar word geargumenteer dar "die goeie" 'n quale is, en dat hierdie quale rofweg
dieselfde objek is as wat dikwels na verwys word as plesier. Indien hierdie siening
van "die goeie" korrek is, dan impliseer dit die moontlikheid van 'n kognitiewe,
egoïstiese weergawe van etiese hedonisme. Die tesis poog eerstens om die verhouding
tussen hierdie siening van "die goeie" en ekonomise fenomene te verduidelik. Daarna
word ondersoek ingestel na die kondisies waaronder die volg van 'n begrensde
rasionele reël 'n beter opsie vir 'n akteur is as om an al die moontlike opsies te kyk en
die beste te kies. Daar word geargumenteer dat die idee dat die "waarheid" die doel
van ondersoek moet wees een so 'n reël is. Volgende word daar gekyk na die kwessie
van altruïsme. Daar word geargumenteer dat ons intuïsies insake die aard van
egoïstiese optrede radikaalonbetroubaar is. Sekere kwessies in evolusionêre biologie
en spelteorie laat dit blyk dat 'n egoïstiese akteur waarskynlik verskeie oënskynlik
"altruïstiese" aksies behoort uit te voer. Die volgende kwessie wat bespreek word is
die verhouding tussen feite en waardes. Daar word geargumenteer dat pogings om
hierdie onderskeid te ondermyn nie suksesvol is nie. Daar word verder geargumenteer
dat die korrekte siening insake hierdie verhouding sekere probleme insake die
verstaan van "obkjektiwiteit" kan ophelder. Die tesis eindig deur die voordele wat uit
spruit uit die aanvaarding van die posisie wat hier voor geargumenteer word. / National research Foundation (NRF)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:sun/oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/53692 |
| Date | 12 1900 |
| Creators | Smit, Johannes Petrus |
| Contributors | Van Niekerk, A. A., Du Plessis, S. A., Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy. |
| Publisher | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | en_ZA |
| Detected Language | Unknown |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 238 p. |
| Rights | Stellenbosch University |
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