Electronic elections, also known as i-voting might help in removing the crisis in our democracy, which is reflected in non-cooperation in the opportunity of expressing their opinions during direct elections. Automation that is brought by i-voting process could mean reducing the risk of human error and also the risk of votes manipulation. On the other hand, the introduction of i-voting means the rise of new risks and vulnerabilities, which could attacker exploit to breach the security i-voting process. Thesis analyzes the Estonian electronic election system and system SERVE in terms of infrastructure and functionality of their components, identifies and suggests the basic possibilities of attacks on these systems. A special section is devoted to the electronic election system in Norway, where the cryptographic theory, which is the base for this system, was reviewed and the evidence that proofs the safety of this system was designed. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:323043 |
| Date | January 2014 |
| Creators | Fritzová, Petra |
| Contributors | Růžička, Pavel, Joščák, Daniel |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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