The legitimacy of judicial review based upon Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms
remains a topic of intense public debate. This thesis considers whether the typical
justificatory arguments in favour of judicial review can withstand critical scrutiny.
Chapter one canvasses the arguments of many of Canada’s Charter sceptics as well as
select international commentators. Chapter two examines Peter Hogg’s claim that it is
appropriate to consider the process of judicial review as a form of institutional dialogue
between courts and legislative assemblies. It is argued that judicial supremacy is a more
accurate description of current institutional arrangements. Chapter three scrutinizes the
claim that judicial review has some special capacity to provide appropriate protection for
minority rights. Finally, chapter four examines whether section 33 of the Charter can be
rehabilitated in order to recalibrate current institutional arrangements. I conclude that it
may be possible to limit judicial supremacy.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uvic.ca/oai:dspace.library.uvic.ca:1828/1799 |
| Date | 26 October 2009 |
| Creators | Down, Michael Stephen Roger |
| Contributors | Webber, Jeremy H. A. |
| Source Sets | University of Victoria |
| Language | English, English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Rights | Available to the World Wide Web |
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