This dissertation answers three questions relating to Jacques Derrida’s writings: why is Derrida concerned with human/animal difference? How should his deconstruction of this distinction be understood in the context of his broader philosophical project? Finally, do the answers to these questions complicate the belief that Derrida’s thought promotes a post-human ethics? Whereas Derrida’s sensitivity to the suffering of non-human creatures partially explains his interest in “the animal,” there are complex reasons for why he frequently returns to interrogate this theme–reasons that can only be understood by first clarifying core features of his philosophy. I maintain that what obsesses Derrida in virtually all of his writings is how a longstanding,
“metaphysical” view of human consciousness proves deconstructable. Following Derrida, I term this view “living presence”–the belief that experience happens presently to beings who are present
to themselves. In undermining this view, Derrida reimagines experience as what I term “survival,” where the very things traditionally thought to be foreign to human subjective life are required for experience to carry on happening.
Importantly, the fact that philosophers repeatedly describe human consciousness in terms of presence is not simply an error. It is rather an effort to preserve the living present against the threat that everything opposed to presence plays in its very possibility. This explains why human/animal difference is so strenuously affirmed throughout the history of Western thought on Derrida’s view. Animals are not simply inferior kinds of beings compared to humans; there is rather thought to be an essential difference between the two. Whereas humans encounter themselves and their world presently, animal are utterly instinctual, reactional, and non-present to themselves. However, by deconstructing the human/animal distinction, Derrida reveals that those features traditionally associated with animals are necessary for any life, human or otherwise, to exist. For this reason, “the animal” is a “pharmakon”: it both sustains and upsets a long-held
understanding of what we uniquely are.
In my final analysis, I examine whether my reading of Derrida’s thought is compatible with a non-human ethics. I do so in two steps: first, I examine a prominent reading of Derrida’s thought that contends that it is. For a large number of thinkers in “animal studies,” Derrida’s thought is aligned with the philosophy Emmanuel Levinas in important respects: whereas Derrida rejects Levinas’ anthropocentrism, he retains the core of Levinas’ ethics. However, I argue that the conditions that Derrida believes make life possible undermine this reading of his work. In the end, I argue that if deconstruction is an ethics, it is so only because it promotes “life” understood in the sense developed in this dissertation. Yet we must be mindful of what deconstruction does not provide in the way of an ethics: on the one hand, any standard of ethical belief is deconstructible. On the other hand, deconstruction does not necessarily promote a more inclusive and compassionate future. Whereas it can do so, it might also inaugurate a future that is less inclusive and more savage. This is, I argue, precisely what cannot be known. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:mcmaster.ca/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/25881 |
| Date | January 2020 |
| Creators | Morison, Thomas Daniel |
| Contributors | Enns, Diane, Philosophy |
| Source Sets | McMaster University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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