Widespread adoption of virtualization has resulted in an increased interest in Virtual Machine (VM) introspection. To perform useful analysis of the introspected VMs, hypervisors must deal with the semantic gap between the low-level information available to them and the high-level OS abstractions they need. To bridge this gap, systems have proposed making assumptions derived from the operating system source code or symbol information. As a consequence, the resulting systems create a tight coupling between the hypervisor and the operating systems run by the introspected VMs. This coupling is undesirable because any change to the internals of the operating system can render the output of the introspection system meaningless. In particular, malicious software can evade detection by making modifications to the introspected OS that break these assumptions.
Instead, in this thesis, we introduce Architectural Introspection, a new introspection approach that does not require information about the internals of the introspected VMs. Our approach restricts itself to leveraging constraints placed on the VM by the hardware and the external environment. To interact with both of these, the VM must use externally specified interfaces that are both stable and not linked with a specific version of an operating system. Therefore, systems that rely on architectural introspection are more versatile and more robust than previous approaches to VM introspection.
To illustrate the increased versatility and robustness of architectural introspection, we describe two systems, Patagonix and P2, that can be used to detect rootkits and unpatched software, respectively. We also detail Attestation Contracts, a new approach to attestation that relies on architectural introspection to improve on existing attestation approaches. We show that because these systems do not make assumptions about the operating systems used by the introspected VMs, they can be used to monitor both Windows and Linux based VMs. We emphasize that this ability to decouple the hypervisor from the introspected VMs is particularly useful in the emerging cloud computing paradigm, where the virtualization infrastructure and the VMs are managed by different entities. Finally, we show that these approaches can be implemented with low overhead, making them practical for real world deployment.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TORONTO/oai:tspace.library.utoronto.ca:1807/24817 |
Date | 30 August 2010 |
Creators | Litty, Lionel |
Contributors | Lie, David |
Source Sets | University of Toronto |
Language | en_ca |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Thesis |
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