Since Plato's time, there have been attempts to show that the generally altruistic way of
life is superior to the totally selfish way of life. Drawing upon the conclusions of philosophers
and social psychologists, I argue that it is better to have a fairly moral character than a totally
selfish one. I first argue that it is possible to have genuinely altruistic motivations (rather than
disguised selfish motivations). I then show that both the altruistic and the selfish way of life are
genuine choices for rational beings. Next I argue that the nature of values is such that they
require reinforcement from others in order for us to verify that what we believe to be values are
indeed values. I further argue that values are unattainable for the totally selfish person.
Subsequently, I point out that values are necessary for an agent to have a meaningful life, and
very likely necessary for a human to be able to have a sense of self. Since most people desire to
have a meaningful life and a sense of self, I argue that the benefits possible to the fairly moral
person outweigh the benefits possible to the totally selfish one, even if the latter can disguise her
selfishness completely. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UBC/oai:circle.library.ubc.ca:2429/12964 |
| Date | 05 1900 |
| Creators | Boston, Alexander Holtby |
| Source Sets | University of British Columbia |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis/Dissertation |
| Format | 14245339 bytes, application/pdf |
| Rights | For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use. |
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