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A game theoretic analysis of adaptive radar jamming

Advances in digital signal processing (DSP) and computing technology have resulted in the emergence of increasingly adaptive radar systems. It is clear that the Electronic Attack (EA), or jamming, of such radar systems is expected to become a more difficult task. The reason for this research was to address the issue of jamming adaptive radar systems. This required consideration of adaptive jamming systems and the development of a methodology for outlining the features of such a system is proposed as the key contribution of this thesis. For the first time, game-based optimization methods have been applied to a maritime counter-surveillance/counter-targeting scenario involving conventional, as well as so-called ‘smart’ noise jamming.Conventional noise jamming methods feature prominently in the origins of radar electronic warfare, and are still widely implemented. They have been well studied, and are important for comparisons with coherent jamming techniques.Moreover, noise jamming is more readily applied with limited information support and is therefore germane to the problem of jamming adaptive radars; during theearly stages when the jammer tries to learn about the radar’s parameters and its own optimal actions.A radar and a jammer were considered as informed opponents ‘playing’ in a non-cooperative two-player, zero-sum game. The effects of jamming on the target detection performance of a radar using Constant False Alarm Rate (CFAR)processing were analyzed using a game theoretic approach for three cases: (1) Ungated Range Noise (URN), (2) Range-Gated Noise (RGN) and (3) False-Target (FT) jamming.Assuming a Swerling type II target in the presence of Rayleigh-distributed clutter, utility functions were described for Cell-Averaging (CA) and Order Statistic (OS) CFAR processors and the three cases of jamming. The analyses included optimizations of these utility functions, subject to certain constraints, with respectto control variables (strategies) in the jammer, such as jammer power and spatial extent of jamming, and control variables in the radar, such as threshold parameter and reference window size. The utility functions were evaluated over the players’ strategy sets and the resulting matrix-form games were solved for the optimal or ‘best response’ strategies of both the jammer and the radar.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/270032
CreatorsBachmann, Darren John
Source SetsAustraliasian Digital Theses Program
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
RightsRestricted Access: Abstract and Citation Only

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