I use a quasi-exogeneous shock to information asymmetry among shareholders to evaluate the effect of information asymmetry on corporate disclosure. In the post-Regulation FD period, the merger between a shareholder and a lender of the same firm provides a shock to the information asymmetry among equity investors, because Regulation FD applies to shareholders but not lenders. After the merger, the shareholder gains access to the firm-specific private information held by the lender. I first provide evidence that information asymmetry among shareholders increases after the shareholder-lender mergers. I then use a difference-in-differences research design to show that after shareholder-lender merger transactions, firms issue more quarterly forecasts (including earnings, sales, capital expenditure, EBITDA, and gross margin), and the quarterly earnings forecasts are more precise. This study provides direct empirical evidence that information asymmetry among investors affects corporate disclosure.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uiowa.edu/oai:ir.uiowa.edu:etd-7893 |
Date | 01 August 2018 |
Creators | Chen, Wei |
Contributors | Collins, Daniel W., Hribar, Paul |
Publisher | University of Iowa |
Source Sets | University of Iowa |
Language | English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | dissertation |
Format | application/pdf |
Source | Theses and Dissertations |
Rights | Copyright © 2018 Wei Chen |
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