Chan Wai-Chung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 119-121). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction / Chapter 1.1 --- Double Auction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1.1 --- One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Sequential Equilibrium of One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.3 / Chapter 1.3 --- Result --- p.4 / Chapter 2 --- Modeling the One-to-One Negotiation / Chapter 2.1 --- Nature of One-to-One Negotiation --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Basic Assumptions in the One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Rationality Assumption --- p.7 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Private Valuation Assumption --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Subjective Belief on Opponent's Private Valuation --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3 --- Rules of the One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.9 / Chapter 2.4 --- Payoff of Players in One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.11 / Chapter 2.5 --- Possible Action Space of Players in One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.12 / Chapter 2.5.1 --- Possible Action Space of the Seller Agent --- p.12 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- Possible Action Space of the Buyer Agent --- p.13 / Chapter 2.6 --- Random Vector Model for the One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.14 / Chapter 2.6.1 --- Problems of Sequential Expectation Model --- p.14 / Chapter 2.6.2 --- Random Vector Model of the One-to-One Negotiation Game --- p.15 / Chapter 2.6.3 --- Existence of Objective Belief in Random Vector Model --- p.17 / Chapter 2.7 --- Information Set in a One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.18 / Chapter 2.7.1 --- Game Tree of the One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.19 / Chapter 2.7.2 --- Information Set in One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.23 / Chapter 2.7.2.1 --- Seller's Information Set in One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.24 / Chapter 2.7.2.2 --- Buyer's Information Set in One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.26 / Chapter 2.8 --- Strategies of Players in One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.28 / Chapter 2.8.1 --- Pure Strategies in the One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.29 / Chapter 2.8.1.1 --- Payoff Function --- p.30 / Chapter 2.8.2 --- Mixed Strategies in One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.30 / Chapter 2.8.3 --- Behavior Strategies --- p.32 / Chapter 2.9 --- Realization Probabilities in One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.33 / Chapter 2.9.1 --- Realization Probabilities for Buyer's Information Sets and Nodes --- p.34 / Chapter 2.9.2 --- Realization Probabilities for Seller's Information Sets and Nodes --- p.35 / Chapter 2.10 --- Beliefs of Players in One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.36 / Chapter 2.10.1 --- Seller's Belief in One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.37 / Chapter 2.10.2 --- Buyer's Belief in One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.38 / Chapter 2.11 --- Sequential Equilibrium of One-to-One Negotiation Model --- p.40 / Chapter 2.12 --- Applying GT for Solving Negotiation Problem --- p.41 / Chapter 3 --- Two stage One-to-One Negotiation Model / Chapter 3.1 --- Notation Used --- p.44 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Physical Interpretation of Seller's and Buyer's Valuation --- p.44 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Discount Factor in One-to-One Negotiation --- p.45 / Chapter 3.2 --- Formulation of Two Stage Negotiation --- p.46 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- First Stage of Negotiation Process --- p.47 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Second Stage of Negotiation Process --- p.47 / Chapter 3.3 --- Buyer Strategies in Two Stage Negotiation --- p.49 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Property of Equilibrium Strategy in Second Round of Negotiation --- p.49 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Property of Equilibrium Strategy in First Round of Negotiation --- p.50 / Chapter 3.4 --- Strategic Combination of Seller Agent --- p.52 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Three Major Types of Strategic Combination --- p.52 / Chapter 3.5 --- Properties of Type A Restricted Equilibrium Solution --- p.54 / Chapter 3.6 --- Properties of Type C Restricted Equilibrium Solution --- p.58 / Chapter 3.7 --- Properties of Type B Restricted Equilibrium Solution --- p.60 / Chapter 3.7.1 --- Relations between α1 and α2 in Type B Combinations --- p.61 / Chapter 3.7.2 --- Behavior Strategy of Buyer Agent --- p.63 / Chapter 3.7.3 --- Seller Agent's Belief in Second Round of Negotiation --- p.64 / Chapter 3.7.4 --- Seller's Payoff Function in Second Round of Negotiation --- p.65 / Chapter 3.7.5 --- Seller's Payoff Function in First Round of Negotiation --- p.67 / Chapter 3.8 --- Best Response of Seller Agent to Buyer Agent's Optimal Strategies when cb Uniformly Distributed --- p.68 / Chapter 3.8.1 --- Solutions of Type A Restricted Equilibrium Solution --- p.69 / Chapter 3.8.2 --- Solutions of Type C Restricted Equilibrium Solution --- p.71 / Chapter 3.8.3 --- Type B Restricted Equilibrium Solution of Seller Agent --- p.72 / Chapter 3.8.3.1 --- Seller's Second Round Payoff Function when cb Uniformly Distributed --- p.73 / Chapter 3.8.3.2 --- Monotonicity of Seller's Second Round Payoff Function --- p.75 / Chapter 3.8.3.3 --- Second Offer Prescribed by Equilibrium Strategy when l≥h+cs --- p.83 / Chapter 3.8.3.4 --- Second Offer Prescribed by Equilibrium Strategy when l<h+cs --- p.88 / Chapter 3.8.3.5 --- Optimization of Payoff in First Round Negotiation --- p.94 / Chapter 3.8.3.5.1 --- Type B Restricted Equilibrium Solution when l≥h+cs --- p.96 / Chapter 3.8.3.5.2 --- Type B Restricted Equilibrium Solution when l<h+cs --- p.99 / Chapter 3.9 --- Numerical Example --- p.111 / Chapter 3.9.1 --- Example 1: Type A Combination --- p.111 / Chapter 3.9.2 --- Example 2: Type B Combination --- p.113 / Chapter 3.9.3 --- Example 3: Type C Combination --- p.114 / Chapter 4 --- Conclusion and Future Works / Chapter 4.1 --- Summary of Strategies --- p.114 / Chapter 4.2 --- Future Work --- p.118 / Bibliography --- p.119
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_324193 |
| Date | January 2003 |
| Contributors | Chan, Wai-Chung., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Information Engineering. |
| Source Sets | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
| Language | English, Chinese |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, bibliography |
| Format | print, ix, 121 leaves ; 30 cm. |
| Rights | Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) |
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