Husserl&rsquo / s phenomenology can be analyzed simply by relying on the conception of intentionality. What I want to do is to put forward the logical grounds on which I can construct an acceptable account of Husserl&rsquo / s theory of intentionality. For this aim, firstly, I need to put some light on the nature of intentional acts or experiences.This suggests us that there is a close connection between the acts and what they are directed towards. Actually many have specified the relation between the act and the object, but what they have ignored was to give an exclusive explication of how such a relation can be connected with the content component.
The penomenological content mediates between the intentional act and the intended object. There are some disagreements as regards whether the act is also directed towards the content or not. One of the significant aims of this research is to shed some light on the adequate arguments by which I will try to clarify that one can speak of such a directedness of intentional acts. In other words I believe that one can not only describe an intentional relation between the act and the intended object but also similar relations between the act and the content.
There seem to be three parts to be examined interconnectedly: these, namely, are act, content and the object. For, the act is directed towards the object with the intermediation of the content. So his theory is not the same as the object theory of intentionality of which there are some defenders. Husserl&rsquo / s content theory is firstly examined in Logical investigations and Ideas respectively.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:METU/oai:etd.lib.metu.edu.tr:http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/2/1070978/index.pdf |
| Date | 01 September 2003 |
| Creators | Gozetlik, Servet |
| Contributors | Inam, Ahmet |
| Publisher | METU |
| Source Sets | Middle East Technical Univ. |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Ph.D. Thesis |
| Format | text/pdf |
| Rights | To liberate the content for public access |
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