品牌內垂直非價格限制，一般係指地域限制與顧客限制，通認為製造商建立有效率、具忠誠度經銷通路的良好競爭手段。製造商藉由此類限制，抑制下游經銷商對單一品排牌產品彼此相互競爭，使得經銷商間品牌內競爭減弱，而隨著降低競爭，經銷商則有能力提高產品價格，增加銷售利潤。相對於製造商而言，增加經銷商能增加經銷商促銷其產品的意願，總體來說，製造商也能增加利潤。尤其，對品牌弱勢、或新進市場的製造商，維持下游經銷商銷售利潤是刺激經銷商促銷、幫助品牌建立的有效方式。此外，品牌內垂直非價格限制亦可解決搭便車問題，製造商因此能確保下游經銷商之銷售不會受到搭便車者的折扣行為而受到影響。
品牌內垂直非價格限制雖有上述功能，惟畢竟其為以合意方式限制品牌內競爭，故對強調「維護自由競爭機能」的反托拉斯法來說，仍有所疑慮。雖說，是否管制此類限制，學說上仍有爭論。事實上，目前多數國家皆將品牌內垂直限制列入管制。但也因為其對競爭是否有影響並未有絕對定論下，如何管制、具體準則如何，似乎仍沒有形成一套明確的準則。尤其在我國，因公平交易法施行未久，實務案例累積數量有限，離標準的建立似仍有一段距離。本文認為，無論從立法歷史、實務管制經驗、經濟理論發達程度與相關探討文獻數量等觀點，美國法確為我國法往後執法的良好參考，適度參酌該國法經驗應有助我國法執法基準之建立。有鑑於此，本文以深入介紹美國法管制品牌內垂直限制為方法，內容中不乏對美國重要司法判決與學說理論之論述，希冀藉此作為我國往後立法、執法的借鏡。
品牌內垂直限制因僅影響品牌內競爭，故美國在Sylvania(1977)案，最高法院已確定將垂直非價格限制以「合理原則」審查。在合理原則下，訴訟原告必須負擔極為沈重的舉證責任，始能獲得勝訴。故往後原告多將品牌內垂直非價格限制定位為「當然違法」之行為類型，如水平限制、垂直約價(垂直價格限制)、聯合杯葛等，以求勝訴。垂直非價格限制與水平限制、垂直價格限制、聯合杯葛如何區分，為即具探討實益的問題。
品牌內垂直限制依芝加哥學派的見解，不論其限制內容為價格或非價格，一律為有助競爭、有效率的競爭方式。芝加哥學派的見解，對近幾十年美國反托拉斯法院，有相當重要的影響。故對芝加哥學派的思想，實有必要加以介紹，始能窺知美國法之全貌。除經濟理論外，從美國法院判決不難看出，非經濟因素對垂直非價格限制合法性的影響實不容忽視。雖說美國法院近來於反托拉斯案件中，多以經濟分析方式決定系爭限制之合法性，但事實上，倫理、社會、道德等價值，最高法院仍無法完全擺脫。而經濟、非經濟因素如何影響、甚至決定品牌內垂直非價格限制合法性，亦為本文的討論重點。
按我國管制品牌內垂直非價格限制之法規，為公平交易法第十九條第六款。該條款性質屬「限制競爭法」領域，但體例上卻列於不正競爭法，似有失當。又，構成該條款之不法限制須有「有限制競爭之虞」之共通要件、且具「不正當限制」之個別要件。此二要件如何具體適用、相互間有何影響，則有檢討之必要。依公平會見解，此二要件判斷標準相若，並無法區分。在如此見解下，導致公平會於執法時僅對「不正當限制」為檢驗，忽略對「有限制競爭之虞」作進一步分析。而是否「不正當限制」又常以無法標準化之非經濟因素，如不公平地位、限制相對人經營自由，為審查重心，卻忽略了限制競爭法管制的基礎—競爭機能受損害。故本文除評論此不合理的現象外，並參酌美國法的執法經驗，提出本文對我國法往後立法與執法的建言。 / Intrabrand vertical nonprice restraints, including territorial and customer restraints, are regarded as those of the best ways that can help a manufacturer to make the distribution of his products efficient. These restraints can lessen or eliminate the intrabrand competition of single manufacturer’s products. Therefore, the downstream dealers could make more profits by raising price. As far as a manufacturer is concerned, these restraints can stimulate dealers’ will of promoting his products by providing showrooms, more service, personnel and so on. After all, the more quantity of a manufacturer’s products dealers sell, the more profits a manufacturer earns. Especially when a manufacturer has weak brand or is new in the market, a manufacturer imposing intrabrand vertical nonprice restrains can build its brand rapidly and easily. Besides, they can solve the problem of free-riding between dealers.
Although intrabrand vertical nonprice restraints have functions of improving distributive efficiency of manufacturer’s products, they are made by agreement between manufacturer and dealer to eliminate competition, and may break antitrust laws that preserve the mechanism of competition. In fact, most of the countries in the world have laws to regulate them. Unfortunately, there is no firm and convincible theory can explain whether intrabrand vertical nonprice restraints harm competition or not. Because of this situation, it’s hard for the antitrust bureau to form a standard of enforcing the antitrust law related to them. Especially in Taiwan, Fair Trade Act (FTA) was made in 1991, so the number of cases accumulated by antitrust bureau, Fair Trade Commission (FTC), is not enough to build a concrete guideline to solve the complexity of intrabrand vertical nonprice restraints. It may be helpful for us to see the foreign regulation toward intrabrand vertical nonprice restraints. Take U.S. antitrust law for instance, there are a long history of regulating experience, abundance of economic theories and essays related to antitrust law. Regarding this point, U.S. law perhaps is a good model to Taiwan.
Because intrabrand vertical restraints only effect competition of single brand, U.S. Supreme Court in Sylvania (1977) evaluates them by rule of reason. Under rule of reason, the plaintiff must show what damage of competition the restraint at issue has did. Because of being in heavy burden of evidence, the plaintiff is actually hard to win in any case. Later, many plaintiffs who want to get rid of the burden of evidence claim the restraint at issue as a per se illegal type such as parallel collusion, resale price maintenance (RPM), group boycott, but most of them fail.
According to Chicago School, intrabrand restraints (price or nonprice) in all circumstances is procompetitive and efficient. The economic theory of Chicago School has had great influence on antitrust decision of Supreme Court in past decades, so it is essential to introduce Chicago School for studying the U.S. antitrust law. Addition to economic theory, non-economic concerns such as protection of small retailers and consumers also have some effect on Supreme Court. But unlike economic theory, non-economic concerns are usually involved with moral and social values, and not only hard to evaluate with economic concepts but with each other. Therefore, Chicago School’s advocates like Bork and Posner claim in antitrust case a judge should ignore about non-economic concerns. It’s, however, still a dispute between scholars.
In Taiwan, regulating vertical nonprice restraints is Article 19(6) of FTA. Theoretically this Article belongs to antitrust law’s territory, but legislators put it mistakenly in ChapterⅢ “unfair competition.” Besides, there are two elements to meet Article 19(6), general and particular element. In other words, an illegal vertical restraint must meet “which is likely to lessen competition or to impede fair competition” called general element and “limiting its trading counterparts' business activity improperly by means of the requirements of business engagement” called particular element. According to the opinion of TFC, general and particular element can’t be distinguished from each other and should be judged by the same standard. Because general element is about the concepts of the market and competition and hard to investigate, in terms of the cost of enforcing laws, FTC will naturally judge Article 19(6) of FTA by focusing the particular element. But what’s “improper” in the particular element is not so clear and usually is involved with non-economic concerns such as the freedom of dealers’, the consumer’s rights of option. In fact, from seeing cases made by FTC, we can conclude that FTC usually put non-economic concerns in a key role in cases and ignore economic concerns. It’s a serious problem we need to discuss. After all, economic concern in the U.S. antitrust law is one of the most important reasons to punish the behavior of agreement. At the end of this thesis, we not only get a conclusion but present some advice of FTA and FTC by comparing with U.S. laws.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0906510163 |
| Creators | 周振鋒, Chou,Cheng-Fong |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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